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Abstract
Using data on the B.E. Journals that rank articles into four quality tiers,
this paper examines the accuracy of the research evaluation process in eco-
nomics. We ﬁnd that submissions by authors with strong publication records
and authors aﬃliated with highly-ranked institutions are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be published in higher tiers. Citation success as measured by RePEc
statistics also depends heavily on the overall research records of the authors.
Finally and most importantly, we measure how successful the B.E. Journals’
editors and their reviewers have been at assigning articles to quality tiers.
While, on average, they are able to distinguish more inﬂuential from less inﬂu-
ential manuscripts, we also observe many assignments that are not compatible
with the belief that research quality is reﬂected by the number of citations.
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The objective of this paper is to shed light on the editorial process of publishing
journal articles in economics. To investigate the determinants of editorial decision
making we use data on the B.E. Journals that rank articles into four quality tiers.
In particular, we analyze whether the editorial process results in more frequently
cited articles appearing in higher tiers.
Many studies have shown that professional success in academia largely depends
on the number and quality of journal articles published (see e.g. Hamermesh and
Pfann, 2011). The quality of a journal article can either be measured in terms of
the number of received citations or in terms of the quality of the journal in which
it appeared. Because journal weights are observable already at the time when an
article is accepted for publication, whereas citations slowly accumulate over time,
tenure and rank committees tend to rely on the signal provided by the quality of the
journal. The rationale underlying the use of journal quality as a signal for article
quality is that editorial and peer review guide articles to journals of appropriate
quality. If editorial and peer review serve their purpose, journal quality adequately
reﬂects article quality and research evaluation based on journal quality weights is
justiﬁed.
A number of studies have investigated the peer reviewing process. Hamermesh
(1994) ﬁnds that referees are generally of higher quality than the authors whose work
they evaluate and they are often among the best scholars in their ﬁelds. Higher-
ranked journals make use of referees who are better researchers in terms of citations
and therefore arguably provide better advice to the editors and authors. Editors
do, however, not assign lower-quality referees to less experienced or junior authors.
According to Laband and Piette (1994), editors do not use their discretion to favor
friends; they rather use it to attract good papers. Wilson (1978) investigates the
success of manuscripts submitted to the Journal of Clinical Investigation. He ﬁnds
that, on average, articles published by this journal receive signiﬁcantly more cita-
tions than articles that were rejected and subsequently published elsewhere. Opthof,
Furstner, van Geer, and Coronel (2000) ﬁnd that papers accepted by Cardiovascular
2Research attract more citations than rejected ones even if a rejected paper later
appears in a journal with a higher impact factor.
On the other hand, peer review is often perceived as intransparent and unfair.
Geographic location, among others, may be a possible source of editorial bias. In
the context of the election of Fellows of the Econometric Society, Hamermesh and
Schmidt (2003) ﬁnd that, controlling for various measures of academic achievement,
scholars from North America are more likely to be elected than others. Focusing on
empirical studies, De Long and Lang (1992) suggest that manuscripts with statisti-
cally signiﬁcant results are more likely to be accepted if the underlying hypotheses
are counterintuitive and if their ﬁndings are likely due to statistical error. The Amer-
ican Economic Review’s choice of the best 20 articles published since its creation
in 1911 (see Arrow, Bernheim, Feldstein, McFadden, Poterba, and Solow, 2011) il-
lustrates the diﬃculties of identifying truly outstanding research. Interestingly, no
article published later than in 1981 was included in the American Economic Review’s
top 20 list. When asked why, Douglas Bernheim explained that each of the members
of the committee had suggested“at least a couple of more recent papers [...] But as
we move from older to younger papers, assessments vary more from person to per-
son.”1 Just as the assessments made by American Economic Review’s committee,
decisions reached by referees and editors often are not unanimous. Bornmann and
Daniel (2008), for instance, ﬁnd a surprisingly low level of agreement among refer-
ees’ recommendations. Coup´ e (2010), ﬁnally, shows that papers that were awarded
best article prizes rarely become the most cited articles published in the respective
journal, although, in most cases, they get cited more often than the median paper.
Some editorial decisions may, therefore, turn out to have been wrong. Laband and
Tollison (2003) ﬁnd that not everything that gets published is valuable. 26 percent
of the articles published in SSCI indexed journals do not get cited at all in the ﬁve
years after publication. Similarly, Gans and Shepherd (1994) present a collection of
famous articles that were ﬁrst rejected, thereby demonstrating that excellence can be
’overlooked’. Both studies suggest that it is diﬃcult to rate the scientiﬁc quality of a
study immediately after its completion. Time-testing is important and the citation
1Bernheim’s remarks can be found in The Economist, 2011, vol. 398, iss. 8722, p. 72.
3ﬂows reﬂect this appreciation across time. However, citation ﬂows are not available
at early career stages when rank and tenure decisions need to be taken. Moreover,
citations are only an imperfect indicator of scientiﬁc inﬂuence. Arrow, Bernheim,
Feldstein, McFadden, Poterba, and Solow (2011), for example, have used citations
as a starting point for their analysis, but have not entirely relied on the number
of citations in selecting their top articles. Ursprung and Zimmer (2007) point out
three shortcomings of citation-based evaluations. First, citations are sensitive to the
halo eﬀect, i.e. some articles are cited because they have been cited before and not
because of their scientiﬁc contributions. Second, too much weight is attributed to
research that serves as an input for further research, and too little to ﬁnal results.
Third, they show that citation habits diﬀer substantially across ﬁelds. This eﬀect can
not only be observed by comparing entire disciplines such as physics and philosophy
but also, as the authors demonstrate using JEL-codes, when comparing subﬁelds of
economics. One may add self-citations, negative citations and citation cartels to the
list of caveats.
We investigate the trade-oﬀ between timely information, i.e. which journal or,
in our case, which tier an article appears in, and the quality of the information con-
tained in citation ﬂows, by analyzing the process of editing three journals published
by Berkeley Electronic Press. We check how the editors’ decisions reﬂect informa-
tion that is available to them and how this information correlates with subsequent
citation ﬂows. We also draw conclusions on the validity of citation counts as an
indicator of research quality. Section 2 describes the particular set-up used in our
analysis. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics, and Section 4 the
econometric results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Editorial processes: The case of the BE journals
Berkeley Electronic Press publishes, among others, three economics journals, The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (BEJEAP), The B.E. Journal of
Macroeconomics (BEJM), and The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (BE-
JTE). All three journals are divided into four quality-rated tiers. The editors ask
4the referees which tier they consider to be appropriate, but the ultimate decision is
up to the editors. In the case of The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics the four tiers
are deﬁned as follows: Publications which appear in the Frontiers are supposed to
be suited for the top general interest journals in economics such as the American
Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, or the Quar-
terly Journal of Economics. Less than 1 percent of all submissions are published in
the Frontiers. Studies published in the Advances are supposed to be comparable in
quality to a top ﬁeld journal in macroeconomics such as the Journal of Monetary
Economics. The publication rate in Advances is 6 percent. Publications in the Con-
tributions tier are supposed to be suited for publication in the European Economic
Review or the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, the publication rate is 16
percent. Publications in the Topics tier are, ﬁnally, supposed to be suited for pub-
lication in Economic Inquiry, the publication rate is 22 percent. While articles in
Frontiers should be of interest to anyone working in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics, as
one moves down the ladder, the articles are aimed at more narrow subcommunities.2
The publication strategy of Berkeley Electronic Press provides us with a unique
setting: we can interpret quality tiers as separate journals. If an article is published
in the Contributions, we interpret it as ﬁrst having been rejected by the Frontiers
and thereafter by the Advances. We argue that this is not at odds with the fact
that higher and lower tiers are not only supposed to reﬂect diﬀerences in quality
but also the diﬀerence between general interest journals and ﬁeld journals. To be
sure, some articles get published in ﬁeld journals simply because they are of interest
to a smaller set of scientists and not because they are of lower quality. However,
especially for young scholars, it is generally preferable if their papers appear in top
general interest journals rather than top ﬁeld journals because top general interest
journals have higher impact factors and are given more weight by tenure committees.
We use citation data to investigate how well reviewers and editors fare at assigning
articles to tiers and argue that these ﬁndings also apply to conventional journals.
Analyzing journals subdivided into quality tiers has several advantages over the
traditional method of tracing rejected manuscripts: (1) there is only one refereeing
2See the journal website http://www.bepress.com/bejm/ratingsystem.html.
5process, so rejected papers are not“contaminated”by second opinions. (2)“Rejected”
manuscripts do not suﬀer from an additional publication lag, but appear at the same
time as higher ranked articles. Finally, (3) all articles are available to the same
audience. We admit, however, that readers can use the quality ratings to ﬁlter their
reading matter, which is liable to inﬂuence the forthcoming citation ﬂow.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
In November 2010, we retrieved from the IDEAS data base, which is part of RePEc,
publication and citation data of all articles that appeared in the BEJEAP, BEJM,
and BEJTE in the years 2001 to 2006.3 This provides us with 572 observations.
Author ratings, ratings of working paper series and journals, and institutional ratings
were collected from the same source. To this data set we added the authors’ gender,
the geographic region of the authors’ aﬃliations, and a dummy which indicates
whether these aﬃliations are non-university institutions.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the publication variables. On av-
erage, publications in our sample were authored by 1.7 scholars. 14.95 percent of
the authors of the average article are female. The share of female authors in the
BEJEAP is markedly higher than in the other two journals. The top author vari-
able, the aﬃliation variables, and the JEL code variables are dummies. “Top author”
indicates whether at least one of the authors is among the top 5 percent in at least
one of IDEAS’s 34 author rankings. Dummies for top institutions indicate whether
the author aﬃliated with the highest-ranked institution is employed by one of the
best 10, the top 11-30 or the remaining 31-124 institutions listed in IDEAS’s in-
stitution ranking.4 JEL code dummies capture the top level categories of the JEL
codes indicated in the article.
About one third of the articles were (co)authored by a top author and more than
50% of the articles were written by authors aﬃliated with top-listed institutions.
3See http://ideas.repec.org/. 2001 is the year in which the B.E. Journals were launched. IDEAS
lists tiers only until 2006.
4These 124 institutions are the best 25% according to the IDEAS database’s“Top Level Institutions
Ranking”, see http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.toplevel.html.
6Articles published in BEJM and BEJTE are signiﬁcantly more likely to have been
authored by scholars from Europe than articles published in BEJEAP (t-statistic
= 5.7). For authors working in North America we observe the opposite. North
American authors contribute to almost three out of four articles in BEJEAP com-
pared to one half of the articles published in BEJM and BEJTE. The ‘no aﬃliation’
dummy indicates whether no aﬃliation was provided for at least one author of an
article. A lower share of female economists in Europe is a potential explanation
for the diﬀerences in gender composition at the three journals. The ‘non-university’
dummy comprises mainly think tanks, international organizations, such as the World
Bank, and central banks. The research focus of these institutions appears to entail
that their staﬀ work more on topics that ﬁt the aims and scope of the BEJAEP
and the BEJM than the BEJTE. According to the JEL code dummies, more than
a ﬁfth of the articles in our sample are classiﬁed as ‘Microeconomics’ (JEL code
D), ‘Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics’ (JEL code E), and ‘Mathematical
and Quantitative Methods’ (JEL code C), respectively. For all other categories, the
shares are lower. But there is much variation across the three journals. For the re-
mainder, we introduce an ‘other JEL’ variable, which captures JEL code categories
A, B, M, N, P, R, and Z that all have less than 20 observations, respectively, as well
as unclassiﬁed articles. Finally, table 1 shows that the number of articles published
in all three journals has increased over time.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the citation variables as found in the
IDEAS database. IDEAS scans the reference lists of all documents uploaded to
the database. Since not all ﬁles can be read without mistakes, IDEAS tends to
underreport citation counts compared to other sources. However, we do not think
that this is likely to bias our results.5 To maximize the information contained in our
sample, we collected all citations referring to our sample articles up to November
2010, which implies that the citation period depends on the publication dates of the
corresponding articles. The number of citations (upper panel) is in the range be-
tween zero and 22 per article with an average of 2.45 citations per article. Articles
published in the BEJM are cited slightly more often than BEJEAP articles and
5For details concerning RePEc’s methodology see Zimmermann (2007).
7Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Publication Variables
Journal all BEJEAP BEJM BEJTE
# coauthors 1.7045 1.8242 1.6612 1.5345
share female 0.1495 0.1905 0.1038 0.125
Africa 0.0035 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.0172 (2)
Asia 0.0682 (39) 0.0513 (14) 0.0929 (17) 0.069 (8)
Europe 0.3619 (207) 0.2454 (67) 0.4754 (87) 0.4569 (53)
Latin America 0.0122 (7) 0.011 (3) 0.0109 (2) 0.0172 (2)
North America 0.6259 (358) 0.7399 (202) 0.5355 (98) 0.5 (58)
Oceania 0.0245 (14) 0.011 (3) 0.0219 (4) 0.0603 (7)
no aﬃliation 0.042 (24) 0.0659 (18) 0.0164 (3) 0.0259 (3)
non-university 0.208 (119) 0.2198 (60) 0.2678 (49) 0.0862 (10)
Top 10 Inst 0.1556 (89) 0.1758 (48) 0.1202 (22) 0.1638 (19)
Top 11-30 0.1836 (105) 0.1685 (46) 0.2131 (39) 0.1724 (20)
Top 30 plus 0.222 (127) 0.2161 (59) 0.2186 (40) 0.2414 (28)
Top author 0.3444 (197) 0.3297 (90) 0.3825 (70) 0.319 (37)
JEL code A 0.0087 (5) 0.0073 (2) 0.0055 (1) 0.0172 (2)
JEL code B 0.0035 (2) 0 (0) 0.0109 (2) 0 (0)
JEL code C 0.215 (123) 0.1465 (40) 0.1639 (30) 0.4569 (53)
JEL code D 0.3479 (199) 0.2821 (77) 0.1803 (33) 0.7672 (89)
JEL code E 0.2255 (129) 0.044 (12) 0.6284 (115) 0.0172 (2)
JEL code F 0.1136 (65) 0.1502 (41) 0.1311 (24) 0 (0)
JEL code G 0.0664 (38) 0.0549 (15) 0.0546 (10) 0.1121 (13)
JEL code H 0.1241 (71) 0.1941 (53) 0.071 (13) 0.0431 (5)
JEL code I 0.0804 (46) 0.1575 (43) 0.0164 (3) 0 (0)
JEL code J 0.1311 (75) 0.1685 (46) 0.1475 (27) 0.0172 (2)
JEL code K 0.0472 (27) 0.0879 (24) 0 (0) 0.0259 (3)
JEL code L 0.1661 (95) 0.2198 (60) 0.0383 (7) 0.2414 (28)
JEL code M 0.021 (12) 0.044 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0)
JEL code N 0.0087 (5) 0.011 (3) 0.0109 (2) 0 (0)
JEL code O 0.1661 (95) 0.1136 (31) 0.3279 (60) 0.0345 (4)
JEL code P 0.0175 (10) 0.0183 (5) 0.0219 (4) 0.0086 (1)
JEL code Q 0.0647 (37) 0.1245 (34) 0.0055 (1) 0.0172 (2)
JEL code R 0.021 (12) 0.0293 (8) 0.0219 (4) 0 (0)
JEL code Z 0.014 (8) 0.0256 (7) 0.0055 (1) 0 (0)
JEL codes missing 0.0437 (25) 0.0659 (18) 0.0273 (5) 0.0172 (2)
2001 0.0734 (42) 0.0586 (16) 0.0874 (16) 0.0862 (10)
2002 0.0629 (36) 0.0476 (13) 0.0656 (12) 0.0948 (11)
2003 0.1451 (83) 0.1429 (39) 0.153 (28) 0.1379 (16)
2004 0.2273 (130) 0.2821 (77) 0.1749 (32) 0.181 (21)
2005 0.1801 (103) 0.1795 (49) 0.2186 (40) 0.1207 (14)
2006 0.3112 (178) 0.2894 (79) 0.3005 (55) 0.3793 (44)
# articles 572 273 183 116
Number of observations in parentheses next to relative frequencies.
8Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Citation Variables
criterion (sub)set observations mean S.D. Min Max
citations all articles 572 2.451 3.5242 0 22
BEJEAP 273 2.5568 3.3962 0 20
BEJM 183 2.612 3.9373 0 22
BEJTE 116 1.9483 3.0867 0 14
Frontiers/Advances 104 3.8173 3.916 0 16
Contributions 212 2.8632 3.9768 0 22
Topics 256 1.5547 2.6116 0 20
weighted citations all articles 572 9.5231 17.9754 0 178.885
BEJEAP 273 9.265 15.9703 0 94.298
BEJM 183 11.6131 22.8806 0 178.885
BEJTE 116 6.8335 12.5759 0 69.17
Frontiers/Advances 104 16.6366 23.2021 0 107.412
Contributions 212 10.8076 17.6475 0 119.212
Topics 256 5.5695 14.515 0 178.885
attract almost one third more citations on average than BEJTE articles. The lower
panel refers to citations weighted by simple impact factors as computed by IDEAS.6
Here, articles that appeared in the BEJM also perform best. BEJEAP articles and
BEJTE articles receive on average only 80% and 59% of the citations garnered by
BEJM articles. These diﬀerences can reﬂect ﬁeld speciﬁc citation habits, diﬀerences
in the journals’ quality within their ﬁelds, or a combination thereof. Articles pub-
lished in the Frontiers or Advances receive signiﬁcantly more citations than articles
published in the lower tiers.7 Articles published in the Contributions receive only
75% of the citations of Frontiers and Advances articles. Topics’ articles receive only
41%. These diﬀerences are even more pronounced when weighted citations are taken
into account, implying that a citation is more likely to come from a higher-quality
journal as identiﬁed by IDEAS if the cited article appeared in one of the two top
tiers.
The editorial system thus appears to perform rather well when it comes to as-
signing higher impact articles to higher tiers. Yet, a closer inspection reveals that
the process of assigning articles to tiers does not work perfectly. The article which
received most citations was published in the Contributions and the article with the
highest score of weighted citations appeared in the Topics. Furthermore, uncited
6Impact factors computed by IDEAS were retrieved from
http://ideas.repec.org/top/seriesfactors.txt.
7The diﬀerence between articles in Frontiers and Advances and the two lower tiers is signiﬁcant at
the 1% level with a t-statistic of 4.44.
9articles can be found in all tiers. Hence, not every article that appears in a higher
tier performs better in terms of citations than lower-tiered articles. The same ap-
plies, of course, to traditional journals: It is well known that the excellent rating of
top journals is due to a rather small number of articles which attract an extraor-
dinary number of citations (see e.g. Wall, 2009). One possible explanation for this
phenomenon is that papers submitted to higher-ranked journals tend to be charac-
terized by a higher degree of originality. Since these studies have fewer links to the
existing literature, their quality may be harder to judge.8 This implies more cita-
tions on average in higher-ranked journals, but also more variation. The numbers
shown in Table 2 appear to corroborate this view. As we move to higher tiers, stan-
dard deviations increase in three of the four cases. This picture is, however, reversed
when coeﬃcients of variation are taken into account, i.e. when standard deviations
are divided by the respective means in order to control for higher averages in higher
tiers. The coeﬃcients of variation actually turn out to be higher in lower tiers.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Determinants of Editorial Sorting
In this section, we analyze the determinants of editorial sorting. Table 3 shows the
results of four ordered probit regressions that examine whether observed characteris-
tics are correlated with the editors’ quality assessment of the submitted manuscripts.
Previous investigations have shown that co-authored studies tend to be of higher
quality (see e.g. Laband and Tollison, 2000; Ursprung and Zimmer, 2007). We also
ﬁnd that the number of co-authors increases the likelihood of a paper being pub-
lished in a higher tier. However, this eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant when we control for
the authors’ personal rankings, for the rankings of the institutions they are aﬃliated
with, and for JEL codes. The share of female authors is not signiﬁcant in any spec-
8Vandermeulen (1972) provides a list of six types of manuscripts that appear in journals of diﬀerent
quality. For instance, according to Vandermeulen, the staple ingredient of average journals is a
type called hunting trophies. Hunting trophies are “gained by applying, purifying, extending or
testing the visions”in another, more original category: creative insights reached by top scholars.
10iﬁcation. Next, we check how the authors’ geographic locations are correlated with
sorting. It turns out that location has no signiﬁcant eﬀect, except for authors from
Oceania and North America. However, the coeﬃcient for North America appears
to be positive only because North America is the home of many of the world’s top
institutions. If one of the authors is aﬃliated with such a top institution, sorting
into higher tiers becomes more likely. When controlling for this eﬀect, the North
America dummy variable loses statistical signiﬁcance. Top authors tend to publish
in higher tiers. The last two ﬁndings may be due to a causal relationship. But it
may just as well be the case that highly ranked scholars and scholars from highly
reputed institutions produce higher-quality output. Finally, JEL code C (Microe-
conomics) has a positive impact on editorial sorting, while the eﬀect of JEL code
E (Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics) is negative. Only the signiﬁcance of
JEL code E is aﬀected by whether year dummies are included in our regressions.
4.2 Determinants of Citation Success
We now turn to analyzing how author characteristics and editorial sorting are related
to subsequent citation success. Even though we use “citations weighted by simple
impact factors” as our dependent variable and not the raw number of citations, we
treat “citations” as a count variable. Referring to the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
method pioneered by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984), Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) stress that all that is required for count data models to give con-
sistent and robust estimates is the conditional mean to be correctly speciﬁed. We
choose the Poisson model because it makes weaker distributional assumptions than
the Negbin model, it is semiparametrically robust, and its estimates can be inter-
preted as semielasticities. As mentioned before, citation periods and the number of
citations depend on the publication dates of the respective articles. We therefore
also control for the year of publication. Table 4 shows the results. In the Appendix
we present robustness checks with raw citations and recursively weighted citations
as dependent variables.
Speciﬁcation (1) includes dummies for journals, tiers, the respective interaction
terms, and publication year dummies. Articles published in the BEJEAP which
11Table 3: Ordered Probit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# coauthors 0.111* 0.137** 0.0119 0.0298
(0.0605) (0.0610) (0.0666) (0.0672)
share female -0.103 -0.0411 0.0638 0.0735
(0.156) (0.160) (0.163) (0.167)
Africa -0.0537 -0.0510 -0.0265 -0.0839
(0.826) (0.830) (0.816) (0.821)
Asia -0.0281 0.00500 0.0321 0.0706
(0.212) (0.213) (0.221) (0.222)
Europe -0.0690 -0.109 -0.144 -0.160
(0.168) (0.169) (0.177) (0.178)
Latin America 0.192 0.0533 0.0841 -0.0239
(0.428) (0.431) (0.439) (0.443)
North America 0.434** 0.358** 0.145 0.101
(0.171) (0.172) (0.186) (0.187)
Oceania -0.648* -0.824** -0.897** -0.981**
(0.362) (0.371) (0.388) (0.392)
no aﬃliation -0.306 -0.320 -0.0829 -0.144
(0.258) (0.261) (0.292) (0.295)
non-university -0.175 -0.158
(0.142) (0.143)
Top 10 Institution 0.915*** 0.914***
(0.162) (0.166)
Top 11-30 0.583*** 0.555***
(0.151) (0.153)
Top 30 plus 0.520*** 0.506***
(0.134) (0.135)
Top author 0.372*** 0.372***
(0.111) (0.113)
JEL C 0.236* 0.235*
(0.127) (0.129)
JEL D 0.121 0.0955
(0.114) (0.115)
JEL E -0.207 -0.228*
(0.137) (0.138)
JEL F -0.0654 -0.0702
(0.169) (0.170)
JEL G -0.338 -0.326
(0.209) (0.210)
JEL H -0.0296 -0.0662
(0.154) (0.155)
JEL I -0.0231 0.0126
(0.197) (0.198)
JEL J -0.128 -0.159
(0.153) (0.155)
JEL K -0.0132 -0.0585
(0.232) (0.235)
JEL L -0.00788 0.00605
(0.142) (0.143)
JEL O -0.199 -0.228
(0.138) (0.139)
JEL Q 0.0921 0.133
(0.203) (0.205)
other JEL 0.117 0.115
(0.153) (0.155)
year dummies no yes no yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0307 0.0498 0.0988 0.114
Observations 572 572 572 572
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Dependent variable: Frontiers = 4, Advances = 3, Contributions
= 2, Topics = 1; Note that continent dummies are not mutually
exclusive, which is why no reference category is needed.
12is our baseline category and in the BEJM attract signiﬁcantly more citations than
papers published in the BEJTE, and, presumably in line with the editorial intention,
articles published in higher tiers receive signiﬁcantly more citations than articles
published in lower tiers. Citation diﬀerences between the tiers are less pronounced
in the BEJM than in the other two journals. The coeﬃcients of the publication year
dummies9 show that articles that were published earlier were cited more often than
articles published in the reference year 2006.
These ﬁndings admit two diﬀerent interpretations: Articles in higher tiers may
either attract more citations because they are better or because researchers are more
likely to read articles allocated to higher tiers. However, as suggested by one of the
referees, the tiered structure of the B.E. Press’s journals helps along these lines,
too. It allows authors with papers in lower tiers to “free ride” oﬀ the articles in
higher tiers: potential readers might initially be attracted by an Advances article
but then also notice another paper lower down. Traditional journals without tiers,
in contrast, are entirely separate and not indexed together. Someone looking for
a particular paper in macroeconomics that was published in a top general interest
journal such as the American Economic Review cannot at the same time see another
paper published in a top ﬁeld journal such as the Journal of Monetary Economics.
Speciﬁcation (2) adds the number of authors and the share of female authors. In
this speciﬁcation, the share of female authors has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number
of citations. Articles with a larger number of authors, however, appear, at a ﬁrst
glance, to get cited signiﬁcantly more often. This result, alas, is not robust. In
speciﬁcation (3), we regress the weighted number of citations also on other author
characteristics, but not on journal tiers. Qualitatively, the results are similar to our
ﬁndings for editorial sorting (see Table 3): the estimates indicate that the number of
authors is not signiﬁcantly related to citation success. Being a top author and being
aﬃliated with a top level institution according to IDEAS’s rankings both increase
citation success. This eﬀect is most pronounced for articles with authors from top-10
institutions. These articles are cited more than twice as often as articles with no top
author and no author from a top institution. Articles by authors from non-university
9See the Appendix for the results.
13Table 4: Poisson Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEJM 0.510*** 0.516*** 0.156** 0.482***
(0.0760) (0.0762) (0.0709) (0.0854)
BEJTE -0.877*** -0.849*** -0.446*** -0.506***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.0950) (0.129)
Contributions 0.774*** 0.761*** 0.408***
(0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0565)
Frontiers/Advances 1.229*** 1.214*** 0.803***
(0.0560) (0.0562) (0.0594)
BEJM*Cont -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.200***
(0.0745) (0.0745) (0.0760)
BEJM*Front/Adv -0.323*** -0.345*** -0.567***
(0.0871) (0.0869) (0.0933)
BEJTE*Cont 0.195 0.215* 0.515***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.128)
BEJTE*Front/Adv 0.0520 0.0580 -0.0135
(0.128) (0.128) (0.134)
# coauthors 0.0703*** -0.00106 -0.0153
(0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0192)








Latin America -1.852*** -1.715***
(0.282) (0.282)








Top 10 Institution 1.017*** 0.881***
(0.0471) (0.0489)
Top 11-30 0.901*** 0.818***
(0.0460) (0.0467)
Top 30 plus 0.567*** 0.483***
(0.0442) (0.0449)
Top author 0.538*** 0.510***
(0.0328) (0.0331)
JEL C 0.144*** 0.0807**
(0.0378) (0.0388)
JEL D -0.210*** -0.207***
(0.0357) (0.0357)
JEL E -0.0414 -0.0267
(0.0455) (0.0464)
JEL F 0.120*** 0.149***
(0.0455) (0.0456)
JEL G -0.938*** -0.950***
(0.0795) (0.0801)
JEL H 0.0192 0.00875
(0.0456) (0.0456)
JEL I -0.166** -0.124*
(0.0644) (0.0651)
JEL J 0.172*** 0.197***
(0.0419) (0.0417)
JEL K 0.384*** 0.466***
(0.0627) (0.0638)
JEL L 0.349*** 0.340***
(0.0401) (0.0404)
JEL O 0.0848** 0.120***
(0.0368) (0.0375)
JEL Q -0.469*** -0.498***
(0.0734) (0.0743)
JEL other 0.0636 0.0492
(0.0436) (0.0436)
Constant 1.443*** 1.324*** 1.470*** 1.103***
(0.0573) (0.0645) (0.0767) (0.0863)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Pseudo-R2 0.142 0.144 0.239 0.259
Observations 572 572 572 572
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
14institutions attract signiﬁcantly fewer citations. The coeﬃcients of the geographic
variables are somewhat diﬀerent from those detailed in Table 3. Articles with authors
from institutions in Europe, Latin America, and Oceania receive signiﬁcantly fewer
citations, while articles from authors with Asian aﬃliations perform signiﬁcantly
better.10
Just as Ursprung and Zimmer (2007), we ﬁnd that citation intensity varies sig-
niﬁcantly across ﬁelds. Articles coded as Law and Economics (JEL code K) and
Industrial Organization (JEL code L) get cited particularly often, whereas little
attention is paid to articles coded as Financial Economics (JEL code G) and Agri-
cultural and Natural Resource Economics / Environmental and Ecological Economics
(JEL code Q). Moreover, after controlling for publication topics, the coeﬃcient on
the share of female authors becomes signiﬁcantly positive: female authors appear to
work on topics, which do not attract many citations (unreported results show that
the coeﬃcient on female share is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero if we control for
all other author characteristics but not for JEL codes). Within given ﬁelds, however,
articles written by women attract signiﬁcantly more citations, be it through better
quality or positive discrimination.
Articles by top-ranked authors and by authors aﬃliated with top institutions
are thus not only more likely to appear in higher tiers, they also get cited more
frequently. In speciﬁcation (4), we include journal tiers as well as author character-
istics. Articles with authors aﬃliated with top-10 institutions still attract 90 percent
more citations than articles without top authors or authors from top institutions.
In other words, the information that the authors’ names and aﬃliations provide to
editors and referees is not fully accounted for by editorial sorting. If the editors’
objective had simply been to allocate articles that are more likely to attract many
citations into higher tiers, they should have more heavily relied on who the authors
are and which institutions the authors are aﬃliated with.
We oﬀer three possible explanations for the ﬁnding that editors might ignore some
relevant information. First, the editors may be biased against highly ranked authors,
10Recall that no reference category for geographic location is required because the sum of their means
is larger than one (see Table 1).
15possibly because editors want to promote less experienced researchers. Second, the
editors may overrate research which is of speciﬁc interest to them. Idiosyncratic
interests can, for example, be triggered by a paper’s topic or its main conclusion.
Note that the editors might not even be conscious of having this kind of bias. Third,
citations may be an inadequate measure of research quality, and highly skilled editors
may be less impressed by an author’s research prowess and aﬃliation than the citing
profession at large. In other words, editors may well provide a more reliable measure
of research quality than the authors’ peers.
4.3 Performance of Editorial Sorting
After having provided some insights into the determinants of citation success, we
now turn to assessing editorial performance assuming that the editors’ objective
had been to sort higher impact papers into higher tiers. As we have already seen,
even after controlling for author characteristics, citations depend signiﬁcantly and
positively on a paper’s ranking by tier. Hence, on average, journal quality provides a
useful signal of the impact a research article ultimately will have. In this section, we
will take a look at what happens beyond the average. We, therefore, interpret peer
reviewing as a testing procedure. An editor decides to accept a paper for publication
if he considers it to be of interest to a certain subset of the scientiﬁc community.
This subset may, for instance, consist of all game theorists worldwide. Under the null
hypothesis, the paper is not relevant for this entire audience. From this population
the editor picks two or three referees who provide a judgement on whether to reject
the null hypothesis and to accept the paper, or whether to reject the paper.
To evaluate the quality of editorial sorting we rely on citation counts to measure
article impact since a better measure is lacking. Our objective is to determine how
many type I and type II errors the editors have made if their objective had been to
sort highly cited articles (in relative terms, i.e. conditional on the topic as given by
the JEL code) into higher tiers. We use our results from regression (3) in Table 4 to
adjust each article’s score of weighted citations to a reference level in order to make
citation scores comparable across journals, topics, and years. More precisely, we
calculate the expected citation scores of all articles, correcting for the three diﬀerent
16journals (BEJEAP, BEJM and BEJTE) and publication years as well as JEL codes.
For these expected scores, we assume the author to be one male scholar aﬃliated
with an institution in North America. Neither the author nor the institution are
top-ranked by IDEAS. We then subtract these estimates from the actual citation
scores of the corresponding articles. Finally, we use these adjusted citation scores
to sort articles into tiers. Table 5 shows the joint distribution of articles according
to editorial and (ex post) citation-based sorting.
Recall that we interpret the editorial sorting procedure to be equivalent to se-
quential submissions to diﬀerent journals. The only diﬀerence is that in this case the
sorting decision is made in one step, i.e. without the article going through further
rounds of revisions. We assume that all authors would prefer to have their arti-
cles published in the Frontiers and Advances tiers. If an article is published in the
Contributions tier, we interpret this as the article having been rejected by Frontiers
and Advances and then having been accepted for publication in Contributions. If
an article has appeared in Topics this means that it has been rejected by all three
higher-ranked tiers.
Table 5: Editorial vs. Citation-based Sorting
published as
Frontiers/Advances Contributions Topics
citation-based Frontiers/Advances 33 50 21
Contributions 40 71 101
Topics 31 91 134
sum 104 212 256
For the Frontiers and Advances “journals” we ﬁnd that 68.3% of all published
articles should have been rejected (type I error). Moreover, 15.2% of the articles
rejected by Frontiers and Advances actually should have been published in these
top tiers (type II error). An alternative and maybe more intuitive measure is the
factor by which editors outperform random assignment. This editorial performance
index amounts to 1.75 which means that the share of correctly sorted articles is 75%
higher if editors are in charge. Note that the size of the three measures (type I and
type II errors, and editorial performance) is to some extent driven by sample size and
the acceptance rate.11 Assuming that the Frontiers, Advances, and Contributions
11Suppose acceptance for publication was purely random. Then type I error would approach one and
17form a single journal, and the Topics represented the set of rejected articles, we
obtain a type I error of 38.6%, a type II error of 47.7%, and editorial performance of
1.11. Since comparable ﬁgures for other journals are not available, it is not possible
to assess the relative performance of the review process at the B.E. Journals, and
we refrain from any discussion.
One drawback of our analysis is that we do not observe the performance of
articles which were rejected at all four tiers and which are therefore not included in
our data set. Because of this lack of data, we cannot avoid underestimating the type I
errors. And since rejected submissions are likely to perform worse than the accepted
articles, we are likely to overestimate the type II errors and to underestimate the
performance of the editorial system relative to random assignment. Our estimates
of the importance of editorial mistakes may also be biased by missing data on cases
in which authors withdrew their manuscripts when they were disappointed with an
editorial decision to publish them in one of the lower tiers. Another drawback is the
use of citations as a proxy for real impact. Adopting the view that citations favor top
authors and authors aﬃliated with top institutions, we are likely to underestimate
the performance of the review process. Finally, we note that in some cases the
classiﬁcation of articles into citation-based tiers depends on very small diﬀerences,
which might not be signiﬁcant given possible measurement errors.
5 Conclusion
It is well known that assessing the overall impact of a piece of economic research
at an early stage is not an easy assignment. Editing learned journals is therefore a
tricky business. Our results suggest that, on average, peer-reviewing yields accurate
estimates of which papers will have an impact and which will not. Given the severe
shortcomings of other measures such as citation counts, it makes sense that quality-
weighted journal publications are used as a research evaluation instrument. In times
of increasing specialization and narrowing research interests (see e.g. Jones, 2009),
type two error zero as the number of published articles declines. On the other hand, the type I
error converges to zero and the type two error to one as the share of accepted articles increases.
18peer-reviewing essentially represents division of labor in research evaluation. No
individual economist can follow all new developments in the discipline, but journal
editors can always attempt to pick referees whom they expect to best know the
literature and methods related to a particular submission. Yet, we have also shown
that a substantial number of errors occur in the editorial process.
To be sure, the aim of a journal editor is not conﬁned to maximizing his journal’s
reputation as measured by the impact factor. Every economist has an idiosyncratic
view of what is important in the discipline and in which direction future research
should evolve. McAfee (2010) notes that although good editors are characterized
by a lack of a personal agenda, they have “an opinion about everything”. It is, of
course, often hard to distinguish between the two. A personal agenda constitutes a
bias and will lead to bad decisions because the editor may be led to reject excellent
submissions that do not ﬁt his agenda and to accept bad submissions that do. An
editor’s personal vision of economics, in contrast, encompasses all aspects and ﬁelds
of economic research and simply summarizes the editor’s conception of research
quality.
Our ﬁndings give a ﬁrst idea of the eﬃcacy of journal editing. But we also note
that our results suﬀer from the absence of data on rejections and from the fact
that we do not know the objective function of the B.E. Journals’ editors. Further
research will be required to provide alternative measures of editorial performance.
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A Appendix
Table 6 shows the robustness of our results with respect to the dependent variable.
In addition to citations weighted by simple impact factors we also use the number
of citations and citations weighted by recursive impact factor. We choose citations
weighted by simple impact factors as baseline model, because it ﬁts the data best.
The reason why simple impact factors perform better than recursive ones is probably
that the recursive weighting scheme is more convex and, therefore, closer to uniform
weighting.
21Table 6: Poisson Estimates.
cites w cites simple w cites recursive
(1) (2) (3)
BEJM 0.142 0.482*** 0.670**
(0.169) (0.0854) (0.305)
BEJTE -0.671*** -0.506*** -0.448
(0.242) (0.129) (0.463)
Contributions 0.412*** 0.408*** 0.554***
(0.103) (0.0565) (0.202)
Frontiers/Advances 0.659*** 0.803*** 0.879***
(0.112) (0.0594) (0.214)
BEJM*Cont -0.245* -0.200*** -0.255
(0.147) (0.0760) (0.266)
BEJM*Front/Adv -0.565*** -0.567*** -0.494
(0.191) (0.0933) (0.319)
BEJTE*Cont 0.523** 0.515*** 0.408
(0.229) (0.128) (0.448)
BEJTE*Front/Adv 0.180 -0.0135 -0.0309
(0.244) (0.134) (0.469)
# coauthors 0.0630* -0.0153 -0.0178
(0.0346) (0.0192) (0.0679)
share female 0.0308 0.146*** 0.0800
(0.0993) (0.0506) (0.177)
Africa -0.407 -0.846 -1.627
(1.017) (0.688) (3.743)
Asia -0.179 0.214*** 0.247
(0.130) (0.0599) (0.206)
Europe -0.140 -0.110** -0.0781
(0.102) (0.0506) (0.171)
Latin America -0.559* -1.715*** -1.858*
(0.303) (0.282) (0.962)
North America -0.210* -0.0381 0.0272
(0.109) (0.0553) (0.189)
Oceania -0.769*** -1.044*** -1.018*
(0.279) (0.166) (0.574)
no aﬃliation -0.250 0.286*** 0.561*
(0.196) (0.0935) (0.304)
non-university -0.136 -0.289*** -0.329**
(0.0832) (0.0441) (0.151)
Top 10 Institution 0.551*** 0.881*** 0.806***
(0.0929) (0.0489) (0.170)
Top 11-30 0.476*** 0.818*** 0.839***
(0.0877) (0.0467) (0.160)
Top 30 plus 0.254*** 0.483*** 0.469***
(0.0836) (0.0449) (0.155)
Top author 0.489*** 0.510*** 0.436***
(0.0642) (0.0331) (0.114)
22cites w cites simple w cites recursive
JEL C -0.0505 0.0807** 0.0177
(0.0776) (0.0388) (0.136)
JEL D -0.144** -0.207*** -0.145
(0.0698) (0.0357) (0.123)
JEL E 0.0223 -0.0267 -0.0539
(0.0951) (0.0464) (0.157)
JEL F 0.126 0.149*** 0.203
(0.0898) (0.0456) (0.155)
JEL G -0.712*** -0.950*** -0.882***
(0.150) (0.0801) (0.272)
JEL H -0.108 0.00875 0.0156
(0.0912) (0.0456) (0.159)
JEL I -0.245* -0.124* -0.0734
(0.129) (0.0651) (0.229)
JEL J 0.107 0.197*** 0.119
(0.0841) (0.0417) (0.147)
JEL K 0.225* 0.466*** 0.378
(0.130) (0.0638) (0.230)
JEL L 0.157* 0.340*** 0.278*
(0.0799) (0.0404) (0.142)
JEL O 0.0923 0.120*** 0.0755
(0.0754) (0.0375) (0.130)
JEL Q -0.216* -0.498*** -0.445*
(0.121) (0.0743) (0.254)
other JEL 0.184** 0.0492 0.0501
(0.0828) (0.0436) (0.153)
2001*BEJEAP 0.209 0.220*** 0.241
(0.164) (0.0824) (0.295)
2002*BEJEAP -0.287 -0.613*** -0.532
(0.246) (0.143) (0.520)
2003*BEJEAP 0.00755 0.0130 0.0955
(0.132) (0.0659) (0.236)
2004*BEJEAP 0.148 0.0202 0.195
(0.109) (0.0573) (0.202)
2005*BEJEAP 0.383*** 0.337*** 0.367
(0.121) (0.0626) (0.228)
2001*BEJM 0.732*** 0.644*** 0.709**
(0.181) (0.0832) (0.279)
2002*BEJM -0.180 -0.497*** -0.307
(0.227) (0.120) (0.383)
2003*BEJM -0.213 -0.235*** -0.0382
(0.185) (0.0880) (0.283)
2004*BEJM 0.663*** 0.637*** 0.692***
(0.134) (0.0631) (0.217)
2005*BEJM 0.167 -0.142** -0.0861
(0.143) (0.0717) (0.244)
2001*BEJTE 0.709*** 0.593*** 0.822*
(0.236) (0.123) (0.422)
2002*BEJTE 0.687*** 0.466*** 0.698
(0.235) (0.122) (0.424)
23cites w cites simple w cites recursive
2003*BEJTE 0.415* 0.206* 0.304
(0.226) (0.120) (0.422)
2004*BEJTE 0.540** 0.155 0.290
(0.227) (0.128) (0.446)
2005*BEJTE -0.179 -0.381** -0.137
(0.290) (0.155) (0.512)
Constant 0.132 1.103*** -1.578***
(0.165) (0.0863) (0.306)
Pseudo-R2 0.173 0.259 0.181
Observations 572 572 572
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24